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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1198 
_____________ 
 
JORGE ANGEL HERRERA FONSECA, 
                                                         Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                         Respondent 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge: Roxanne C. Hladylowycz 
(BIA-1: A088-881-362) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 22, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District Judge* 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 9, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION** 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
* The Honorable John E. Jones III, United States District Judge for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Jorge Angel Herrera-Fonseca appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 
dismissal of his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for 
withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection.  Herrera-
Fonseca argues that his aggravated felony convictions for second-degree robbery and 
battery do not constitute particularly serious crimes rendering him statutorily ineligible 
for withholding of removal.  He also contends that he is eligible for withholding of 
removal because he was targeted for imputed nationality and religion.  Finally, Herrera-
Fonseca asserts that the BIA erred in determining that he waived review of his claim for 
CAT.  We will deny Herrera-Fonseca’s petition for review.   
I. Facts1 & Procedural Background 
 A native and citizen of Mexico, Herrera-Fonseca was convicted of second-degree 
robbery, a felony in violation of California Penal Code §§ 211-212.5(c), and battery, a 
felony in violation of California Penal Code §§ 242-243(a), in 2008.  Because the acts 
were committed in participation with a criminal street gang, his sentence was enhanced 
by California Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)(C). 
An IJ ultimately found Herrera-Fonseca to be an aggravated felon, based on both 
the theft offense, pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 
101(a)(43)(G), and a crime of violence, pursuant to INA § 101(a)(43)(F), and ordered 
                                                 
1 “We take our facts from the final order of the BIA, and to the extent the BIA 
relied upon it, the Immigration Judge’s decision.”  Sesay v. Attorney Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 
218 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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him removed from the United States in 2009.  Nevertheless, in 2013, he re-entered the 
United States without inspection, and filed an application for asylum and for withholding 
of removal, expressing a fear of persecution and torture upon returning to Mexico.  The 
matter was therefore submitted to an IJ for determination.  After several hearings before 
the IJ, the BIA remanded requiring the IJ to provide a more definitive statement of the 
basis for its decision-making.  The BIA then dismissed Herrera-Fonseca’s appeal.  This 
timely petition followed. 
II. Jurisdiction 
 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.31(e) and 1003.1(b)(3).  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
“Because the BIA issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather than that 
of the IJ.”  Patel v. Attorney Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 2010).  “However, we also 
look to the decision of the IJ to the extent that the BIA defers to, or adopts, the IJ’s 
reasoning.”  Id. 
“We affirm any findings of fact supported by substantial evidence and are bound 
by the administrative findings of fact unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled 
to arrive at a contrary conclusion.”  Camara v. Attorney Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de 
novo, ordinarily subject to the principles of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984).”  Sesay v. Attorney Gen., 787 F.3d 
215, 220 (3d Cir. 2015).  Chevron deference is not appropriate, however, when “we are 
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asked to review an unpublished, non-precedential decision issued by a single BIA 
member.”  Mahn v. Attorney Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). 
III. Discussion 
Herrera-Fonseca raises three issues on appeal.  First, he argues that his aggravated 
felony convictions for second-degree robbery, pursuant to §§ 211-212.5(c)2 of the 
California Penal Code, and battery, under id. §§ 242-243(a),3 do not constitute 
particularly serious crimes.  If either is determined to be particularly serious, that finding 
renders him statutorily ineligible for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  Second, he asserts that he is eligible for withholding of removal 
because he was targeted for imputed nationality and religion.  Third, he claims that the 
BIA erred in determining that he waived review of his claim for CAT. 
“To demonstrate her qualification for withholding of removal, ‘an alien must show 
that if returned to [her] country, it is more likely than not that [her] life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.’  ‘To meet this standard, [an alien] must show with objective 
evidence that it is more likely than not [that she] will face persecution if [she] is 
deported’ to her home country.  ‘[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not 
                                                 
2 Under California law, robbery is “the felonious taking of personal property in the 
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear.”  Cal. Penal Code § 211. 
 
3 Battery is defined as “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the 
person of another.”  Id. § 242. 
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include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.’”  Ordonez-Tevalan v. 
Attorney Gen., 837 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
Withholding of removal, however, is unavailable if an alien committed a 
“particularly serious crime” because the alien is deemed a “danger to the community of 
the United States.”  Flores v. Attorney Gen., 856 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)).  Under the INA, a “‘particularly serious crime’ includes 
crimes that are considered ‘aggravated felon[ies]’ for which the alien received a prison 
sentence of at least five years.”  Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)).  In turn, the INA 
enumerates twenty-one descriptions of aggravated felonies, including “a crime of 
violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) 
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), and 
“a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the 
term of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).  Flores, 856 F.3d 
at 285. 
We discern no error in the BIA’s decision that Herrera-Fonseca was convicted of a 
particularly serious crime.  In reaching its conclusion, the BIA reviewed the record and 
the IJ’s decision in its entirety.  The BIA noted that the IJ “properly considered the nature 
and circumstances” of Herrera-Fonseca’s robbery conviction.4  Specifically, the BIA 
                                                 
4 Because the BIA did not reach the question of whether Herrera-Fonseca’s battery 
conviction constituted a particularly serious crime, neither will we.  See Myrie v. Attorney 
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highlighted that the IJ considered how Herrera-Fonseca and his co-defendant were under 
the influence of alcohol and marijuana when they each punched the victim in the face 
multiple times during the robbery, that he “was sentenced to 1 year in jail,” and that the 
sentence was subject to a gang enhancement.  Moreover, the BIA also acknowledged that 
the IJ “fully considered” Herrera-Fonseca’s “explanations and attempts to minimize the 
crime” in its determinations.  As a final point, the BIA, after considering the totality of 
the circumstances, agreed that Herrera-Fonseca was therefore convicted of a particularly 
serious crime pursuant to the INA.   
We agree with the BIA that Herrera-Fonseca’s conviction for second-degree 
robbery is a particularly serious crime rendering him statutorily ineligible for withholding 
of removal.  Here, Herrera-Fonseca committed the robbery through the use of physical 
force when he punched the victim in the face multiple times.  The conviction was of a 
particularly serious crime because it was of “a theft offense . . . for which the term of 
imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), and a crime of violence 
for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year, id. § 1101(a)(43)(F).  The record 
reflects that, as a result of the robbery conviction, he was sentenced to one year in jail.   
Finally, Herrera-Fonseca claims that the BIA erred in determining that he waived 
review of his claim for CAT.  We decline to address this argument, as the BIA 
                                                 
Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (“If the Board relies only on some of the grounds 
given for denying relief, we review only those grounds.”). 
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determined, in the alternative, that he failed to carry his burden of proving that it is more 
likely than not that he would be tortured upon returning to Mexico.5 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we shall deny Herrera-Fonseca’s petition for review. 
                                                 
5 The BIA addressed Herrera-Fonseca’s claim in the alternative, and held that, 
“based on the entirety of the record,” he had “not carried his burden of proof required for 
protection under the CAT.”  We agree with that determination because the record is 
devoid of any evidence providing objective proof that it is more likely than not that he 
would have been tortured upon his return to Mexico.  
